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AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY UNDER CONFLICTING
CORPORATE MORTGAGE INDENTURES
By HENRY E. FOLEY AND L. WELCH POGUE*
W HEN a company purports or agrees to mortgage not only
property owned by it at the time of e-xecuting the mortgage
but also other property which may be thereafter acquired, a number
of important questions arise. What is the effect and scope of the
clause in such a mortgage purporting to convey after-acquired
property? If such a mortgaging company consolidates with or
merges into another company, or if it sells its assets to some
company, will the property acquired by the successor' feed a
mortgage of the predecessor? And where the successor, at
the time of a merger or purchase, has a mortgage of its own con-
taining an after-acquired clause, does its mortgage or that of the
predecessor obtain a pror lien on property acquired by such a
successor after the merger or purchase? These and related prob-
lems will be considered in this paper.
I
EFFECT AND SCOPE OF AN AFTER-AcQuIRED CLAUSE
Where a company mortgages its property with an after-
acquired clause and later acquires property, questions arise as to
(1) the effect of such a clause purporting to subject after-acquired
property to the lien of the mortgage and (2) the scope of the
*Both of the Boston, Massachusetts, bar.
'The word "successor" is used in this article in a broad sense to
cover a consolidated, reorganized, merging, or purchasing company. The
word "predecessor" is used to cover a consolidating, original, mcrged,
or selling company.
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after-acquired clause, or in other words, what property is included
therein.
1. It is apparent that there can be no actual mortgage of
after-acquired property (that is, no transfer of title or creation
of an in rem interest) until the property is acquired.2  Hence,
in so far as an attempt is made in the granting clause of a
mortgage to mortgage after-acquired property, it necessarily
amounts to no more than a contract that, when the property
referred to is acquired, it will feed the mortgage.3 Like other
contracts to give security, damages at law being inadequate, this
contract is specifically enforceable in equity 4 Thus in tile fre-
quently cited case of Trust Co. of America v City of Rhinelander'
the court said
"Such clauses" [after-acquired property clauses] "are sus-
tainable in equity only as contracts to mortgage the future ac-
quired property Enforcing the mortgage against it is sub-
stantially enforcing specific performance."
There being a specifically enforceable contract to convey property
an equitable interest is created in the mortgagee thereunder in
the after-acquired property when it is acquired by tile mortgagor,
and the mortgagee; may be said to have an equitable lien thereon.'
2At law a mortgage of property to be acquired in the future is void.
Pierce v. Emery (1856) 32 N. H. 484, 505 Bayler v. Commonwealth,
(1861) 40 Pa. 37 42: Emerson v. North American Ry. Co., (1877) 67
Me. 387 391 Jacobson v. Smith, (1902) 73 App. Div. 412, 415, (appeal
dismissed 172 N. Y. 654 in mem. op.) 3 Fletcher, Cyc. of Corp., sec.
1279- 1 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed., sec. 209. See also 5 Cook, Corpor
ations, 8th ed., sec. 8573See Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Personal Property
19 Harv. L. Rev. 557 558 Trust Co. of Amer. v. City of Rhinelander
(C.C. Wis. 1910) 182 Fed. 64, 69. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Staten Island
'Clay Co., (1905) 70 N. J. Eq. 550, 553, 67 Atl. 1078, Kribbs v. Alford,(1890) 120 N. Y. 519, 524, 24 N. E. 811, Glenn, Creditors' Rights and
Remedies, sec. 260.
4See authorities cited in note 3 and see 4 Thompson, Corporations,
3d ed., sec. 2622 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Staten Island Clay Co.. (1905)
70 N. J. Eq. 550, 67 Atl. 1078 Holroyd v. Marshall. (1861) 10 H. L. C.
191, 211. National Bank of Wilmington & Brandywine v. Wilmington.
N. C. & S. Ry., (1911) 9 Del. Ch. 258. 81 At. 70. noted in 25
Harv. L. Rev. 294 cf. Pennock v. Coe, (1859) 23 How. 117 16 L. Ed.
436. In a few jurisdictions this contract to mortgage after-acquired prop-
erty may not be specifically enforceable. See Williston. Transfers of
After-Acquired Personal Property 19 Harv. L. Rev. 557 559.
5 (C.C. Wis. 1910) 182 Fed. 64, 69.
GAs a matter of practice and convenience large corporate inort-
gages are usually made by way of a conveyance in trust to a trustee.
But the more universally applicable word "mortgagee" has been used
in this article to cover the case where the conveyance by way of mort-
gage is to a trustee.
"Williston, Transfers of After-Acquired Personal Property 19
-arv. L. Rev. 557, Glenn, Creditors' Rights and Remedies, see. 261
Trust Co. of Amer. v. City of Rhinelander, (C.C. Wis. 1910) 182 Fed.
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The conclusion that an after-acquired property clause creates
in the mortgagee an equitable lien on such property when acquired
has been reached on another theory which it is submitted is
unsound. Under this other theory a mortgage of after-acquired
property is said to amount to an equitable assignment as soon as the
property comes into existence' and it is urged that this "is respect-
ed and accorded efficacy because it is executed and because there
is no affirmative reason for undoing what has been done."9  But
as we have seen, there could be no assignment by the mortgagor
at the date of the mortgage either at law or in equity and
the mortgagor has done no later act of assigning. If, then, there
is an assignment it must be because equity has made the assign-
ment on behalf of the mortgagor. Why should equity do this except
on principles of specific performance? No other ground for the
exercise of equity jurisdiction exists. The New York court of
appeals in discussing this problem has said
"A court of equity, in giving effect to such a provision
does not hold that a conveyance of that which does not exist
operates as a present transfer in equity, any more than it does at
law. But it construes the instrument as operating by way of
present contract, to give a lien, which, as between the parties
takes effect and attaches to the subject of it as soon as it comes
into the ownership of the party."'0
The view, in whatever form put, that a mortgage of after-acquired
property is an executed transaction, rests on the loose conception
that an executory transaction is one which requires action-an
executed one, no action. It is assumed that after the mortgage
is executed the mortgagor need do nothing, hence the transaction
64, 69- Kribbs v. Alford, (1890) 120 N. Y. 519, 24 N. E. 811 Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Staten Island Clay Co., (1905) 70 N. J. Eq. 550, 67 At.
1078, Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1910) 112 Md. 50, 75 Atl. 517
521 Hamlin v. Jerrard, (1881) 72 Me. 62, 75; cf. Pennock v. Coe.
(1859) 23 Ilow. 117 129, 16 L. Ed. 436, where the court said. "We
think it very clear, if the company, after having received the money on
the bonds and given the mortgage security, had undertaken to divert
the fund from the purpose to which it was devoted, namely, the con-
struction of the road and its equipment, and upon which the security
mainly depended, a court of equity would have interposed, and enforced
a specific performance. And if a court of equity would thus have
compelled a specific performance of the contract, we may certainlv with
confidence conclude that it would sanction the voluntary performance
of it by the parties themselves, and give effect to the security as soon
as the property is brought into e.xistence." See also 3 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence, 4th ed., sec. 1236; 5 Cook, Corporations, 8th ed., sec. 857
8See an article by Blair, Allocation of After-Acquired Mortgaged
Property, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 222, 225.
9Ibid at page 226.
IOKribbs v. Alford, (1890) 120 N. Y. 519, 524, 24 N. E. 811.
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is thought to be executed. The error is obviously in the lack of
an accurate definition of executory and executed transactions.
Under this conception a contract to sell land situated in State A
would be executed when made, if by the law of State A the vendee
could secure the land by a proceeding in that state without personal
jurisdiction over the vendor But clearly such a contract is execu-
tory The truth is that if a promisor must act to keep his promise
the transaction is executory The fact that, if the promisor does
not act, "he same result can be secured by legal proceedings and
thus damage to the promisee avoided is immaterial. Thus. where
there is a clause purporting to mortgage after-acqured property
the mortgagor must act by giving a lien in order to perform its
promise, but if it does not act eqity will prevent damage to the
mortgagee by giving the same result as though the mortgagor had
acted. This does not, however make the transaction an executed
one.
The equitable interest in after-acqired property created as
a result of the after-acquired clause, should, if it is to be treated
as other equitable interests, be held to be enforceable against
all but purchasers for value, in good faith, and without notice.
But since, in the ordinary case, the mortgagor retains possession
of the after-acquired property a situation is created which
might deceive creditors and which is possibly objectionable
for other reasons." Accordingly, there is authority in some
jurisdictions to the effect that even though an equitable interest
is created- ' it will not be enforceable against creditors of the
mortgagor unless the mortgagee takes possession." The weight
of authority however (at least in the case of corporate mortgages
where the danger of deception by the retention of possession nor
mally is very slight) recognizes an equitable interest in the prop-
ertv which is acquired bv the mortgagor and treats the equitable
interest created by an after-acquired clause like other equitable
interests. and consequently it is enforceable against all but
purchasers for value in good faith and without notice.
lWilliston. Transfers of After-Acquired Personal Property 19
Harv. L. Rev. 557 563 et seq.
121n some jurisdictions it is held that an after-acquired clause will
not create in the mortgagee an equitable interest in the property when
acquired. Ibid, at page 579.
1
3 See a collection of jurisdictions following this view. at least as
to personal property, in 4 Thompson, Corporations, 3d ed., sec. 2625.
note 38 where it is pointed out that a distinction is sometimes made be-
tween real estate and personal property in this respect. See in thl
connection Mass. Gasoline & Oil Co. v. The Go Gas Co., (1927) 259
Mass. 585, 156 N. E. 871. Cf. statute of La. cited in note 15.
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This aricle deals primarily with the law in jurisdictions which
give effect to the after-acquired clause' 5 even as against creditors
of the mortgagor, but the principle here indicated will, however,
be helpful in solving the problems arising in connection with after-
acquired property in other jurisdictions.
2. The scope of an after-acquired property clause is a
matter of construction. 16  The covenant of the mortgagor to
cause after-acquired property to feed the mortgage is ordinarily
construed to apply only to property subsequently acquired by the
mortgagor and not to include property acquired by a successor.":
Thus, in speaking of the scope of the after-acquired clause in
a corporate mortgage, the court said in New York Securiy &
Trust Co. v. Louisville, E. & St. L. Consol. R. Co. .18
The after-acquired property clause in each of the mortgages
can rightly be construed, I think, to extend only to property
subsequently acquired by the mortgagor. The Consolidated Com-
pany is a new and different organization."
A mortgagor may, however, expressly provide that the after-
acquired clause is to cover after-acquired property of a "suc-
cessor," 9 or the context and situation may show that the mort-
14See 1 Jones, Mortgages, 8th ed., sec. 209; 5 Cook. Corporations.
8th ed., sec. 857- 3 Fletcher, Cyc. of Corporations, sec. 1279. Cf. 2
Machen, Corporations, sec. 1854.
15Some states by statute have made after-acquired clauses effective in
mortgages by certain classes of corporations. See, e. g., Minn. G. S.
1923, (2 Mason's Minn. Sts.,) secs. 7449-7450, (relating to public service
corporations) and sec. 7513 (relating to telephone and telegraph com-
pames) Mass. Gen. Laws, 1921, ch. 160, sec. 47 and ch. 161. sec. 25(relating to railroads and street railways) 2 Idaho Comp. Sts. 1919.
sec. 6361 Ga. Code 1926, sec. 3256 Iowa Code 1924. sec. 7933 (relating
to railway corporations) 2 Mont. Rev. Code 1921, sec. 8255 1 No. Dak.
Compl. Laws 1913, sec. 6731, 1 So. Dak. Rev. Code 1919, sec. 1551 2
Okla. Compl. Sts. 1921, sec. 5257 cf. also Ala. Code 1923. sec. 9008
Ariz. Rev. Sts. 1913, sec. 4099- Cal. Civil Code 1923, sec. 2930- Conn.
Gen. Sts. 1913, sec. 5208. But see La., Merrick's Rev. Code 3d Ld.. art.
3308, prohibiting any conventional mortgage of future property.
161t is of course clear that apt words must be used in order to make
the mortgage cover after-acquired property. See 4 Thompson, Corpor-
ations, 3d ed., sec. 2621, 41 C. J. 480, note 98.
"oRy. Steel Springs Co. v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., (D.C. Il. 1917)
246 Fed. 338, 347- Trust Co. of Amer. v. City of Rhinelander, (C.C. Wis.
1910) 182 Fed. 64, 69- Kribbs v. Alford, (1890) 120 N. Y 519, 525. 24
N. E. 811, Diggs v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., (1910) 112 'Md. 50, 75 tl.
517 525 Hinchman v. Pt. Defiance Ry. Co., (1896) 14 \rash. 349, 364,
44 Pac. 867 For a slight modification of this see, Susquehanna Trust
& Safe Deposit Co. v. United Tel. & Tel. Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1925) 6
Fed. (2d) 179, 181 cf. Ithaca Trust Co. v. Ithaca Traction Co., (1928)
248 N. Y. 322, 162 N. E. 93.
is(C.C. Ind. 1900) 102 Fed. 382, 398.
"In one case the court held that the word "successor" meant a "cor-
porate successor" and that a purchasing corporation was not such. Miss.
Valley Tr. Co. v. So. Tr. Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1919) 261 Fed. 765. Cf.
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gage was not intended to be confined to a fter-acquired property
of the mortgagor. Thus, in Compton v. Jessup, 20 the court said
that the mortgage indenture contemplated consolidation and that
it was intended that after-acquired property of the consolidated
company should feed the mortgage.2
1
Furthermore, an after-acquired clause, when properly con-
strued, may be confined to certain types of property, for example,
where a railroad or a street railway mortgages all its after-acquired
property it is generally held to include all the property which
forms part of and is to be used as a part of its system as fixed
by its charter powers as of the date of the execution of the mort-
gage,22 or such a clause may be confined to property which the
mortgagor is contemplating acquiring.23
Normally a mortgage will not be construed as applying to
property which at the time of executing the mortgage it would
have been ultra vires for the mortgagor to acquire. If the
mortgaging company convenanted to acquire and mortgage prop-
erty the acquisition of which was not within its charter powers,
such an attempted mortgage would itself be ultra vires.24 This
Commercial Tr. Co. v. Chattanooga Ry. & Lt. Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1921) 281
Fed. 856, 859.
20(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1895) 68 Fed. 263, 286.
21Cf. In re Sentenne & Green Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1903) 120 Fed. 436.
2241 C. J. 480, note 99- see Susquehanna Trust & Safe Dep. Co. v.
United Tel. & Tel. Co., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1925) 6 Fed. (2d) 179" Amer.
Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. N. Y. Rys. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1922) 293
Fed. 612, 630- Ithaca Trust Co. v. Ithaca Traction Co., (1928) 248 N. Y
322, 162 N. E. 93, 95. Thus where a railroad acquires, e. g., lots of
land having no relation to the public use, such lots may not be subject
to the after-acquired clause of a mortgage. Trust Co. v. Traction Co.,
(1922) 106 Oh. St. 577 140 N. E. 380. See also, In re Sentenne &
Green Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1903) 120 Fed. 436, 439- 5 Cook, Corporations,
8th ed., sec. 857 Cf., in this connection, Smith v. McCullough, (1881)
104 U. S. 25, 26 L. Ed. 637 where the phrase "all the present and in
future to be acquired property of the Burlington and Southwestern
Railway that is to say " followed by a detailed description of
types of property, was held not to cover property thereafter acquired
but not falling within one of the described categories. See also West-
inghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co., (C.C.A. 2(d.
Cir. 1920) 263 Fed. 532.23Hinchman v. Pt. Defiance Ry. Co., (1896) 14 Wash. 349, 358,
44 Pac. 867 Commercial Trust Co. v. Chattanooga Ry. & Lt. Co.,
(D.C. Tenn. 1921) 281 Fed. 856, 861 and cf. discussion in Ry. Steel Springs
Co. v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., (D.C. Del. 1917) 246 Fed. 338, 348 et seq..
and Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Chicago & E. 1. R. Co.. (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1918) 253 Fed. 868, and Trust Co. v. Traction Co., (1922) 106 Oh. St.
577 598, 599.24See Commercial Trust Co. v. Chattanooga Ry. & Lt. Co., (D.C.
Tenn. 1921) 281 Fed. 856, 860, where it is stated "On the other hand a
railroad company is without authority to mortgage as after-acquired
property a line of railroad or other property which it is not authorized
within the limitations of its then charter to build or acquire; such at-
tempted mortgage being ultra vires."
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objection would not exist if the mortgage merely provided that
property acquired by virtue of any additional powers which might
thereafter be obtained by the mortgagor would feed the mortgage,
in which case the covenant should be effective.25 Normally, how-
ever, the parties do not have any such unusual situation in mind and
hence, in the absence of express words to that effect, the after-
acquired clause is construed to apply only to property which could
properly be acquired by the mortgagor at the time of executing
the mortgage. This, however, is a question of construction and
may be controlled by the phraseology actually used.
II
WHERE A COMPANY MORTGAGES ITS PROPERTY WITH AN
AFTER-AcQUIRED CLAUSE AND THEN TRANSFERS ITS PROPERTY
To ANOTHER COMPANY WHICH HAS No MORTGAGE AT TiE TIME
OF SUCCESSION AND WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRES PROPERTY
In all the main classes of transfers which may fall within
the facts assumed under this heading, that is, transfers by way
of consolidation, reorganization, - merger, and ordinary purchase,
the predecessor and the successor are different organizations. The
question at once arises as to whether property acquired by the
successor .after the succession will, in any case, be subject to the
mortgage of a predecessor-the successor being a distinct and
different company
It is axiomatic that A cannot mortgage B's present property.
A fortiori A cannot mortgage B's future property. -Y Any attempt
to do so can have no effect upon B or upon B's property. In
speaking of the effect on property acquired by a successor of
the after-acquired clause in a mortgage of a predecessor, it was
said in Trust Company of America v. City of Riunelander -2
"As the mortgagor could not expressly contract to mortgage
the after-acquired property of others, such property can never
come within the mortgage by the force of such a contract alone,
unaided by the rule of accession, estoppel, or some other equitable
consideration."
25Cf. Ithaca Trust Co. v. Ithaca Traction Co., (1928) 248 N. Y
322, 162 N. E. 93, 95, and see Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., (C.C.A
6th Cir. 1898) 90 Fed. 322, 325.
-6The term "reorganization," as used in this article, covers the case
where a company sells its assets to a new company formed by security
holders of the old company.2 7See 4 Thompson, Corporations, 3d ed., sec. 2620.
2s(c.c. Wis. 1910) 182 Fed. 64.
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It seems clear, therefore, that property acquired by a successor
will not feed the mortgage of a predecessor unless some special
ground for that result is found.2 9
One such ground may be seen in a state statute relating to
corporate consolidations, mergers, or reorganizations. Such a
statute may contain controlling, as distinguished from merely en-
abling, provisions, indicating that the new company is to take the
place of the old-to step into its shoes."' As was said by an
Ohio court in commenting upon a case involving a statute which
was so construed
The Trustee for the bondholders was seeking to reach
after-acquired property by virtue of a clause in the mortgage to
that effect, which clause did not by its terms apply to the successors
of the Southern Ohio Traction Company It was then decided by
this court that notwithstanding the omission to make the after-
acquired property clause applicable to successors, the provisions
of section 9038. General Code, necessarily produced that effect,
because the substantial existence of the consttuent companies
was thereby perpetuated by being merged in the consolidated
company "31
Where this is so and the successor acquires property, in connec-
29Kribbs v. Alford. (1890) 120 N. Y 519, 525, 24 N. E. 811 l-inch-
man v. Pt. Defiance Ry. Co., (1896) 14 Wash. 349, 364, 44 Pac. 867
Trust Co. of Amer. v. City of Rhinelander, (C.C. Wis. 1910) 182 Fed.
64, 69 But cf. language in Commercial Trust Co. v. Chat. Rv. & Light
Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1921) 281 Fed. 856, 860 et seq.
3 iCf., n this connection, Minn. G. S. 1923 (2 Mason s Minn. Sts.
1927,) sec. 7509, which provides "Rights and duties of consolidated
corporation Within this state, such [consolidated I corporation
shall succeed to all the rights, powers, franchises, contracts, privileges
and immunities, and be subject to the same duties, liabilities, and
obligations in all respects as were granted to or imposed upon the
original corporations but all rights of creditors and all liens upon tile
property of either of the consolidating corporations shall be preserved
unimpaired, and all the debts, liabilities, and duties of either shall
thenceforth attach to the new corporation, and be enforceable to the
same extent and in the same manner, as if such dehts. liabilities, and
duties had been originally incurred by it " Cf. 2 N. J. Conip. Sts. of
p. 1661 sec. 167 2 Ill. Callaghans Sts., ch. 32, sec. 71 Del. Rev. (ode
1915, sec. 1974 Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 9038. Fla. Law, 1925. c. 10096,
sec. 37 (which provides that on consolidation the liens on property of
either of the predecessor corporations "shall be preserved unipaired,
limited in lien to the property affected by such liens at the time of the
consolidation, ") Va. Gen. Law 1923, sec. 3823. The type of statute
considered in this part of the article must be distinguished from what
is probably a much more common type of statute and which will be
considered later in this article but which merely imposes on the sue
cessor the obligations of the predecessor. It is not intended by the
citation of the above statutes to indicate that they belong to one class
rather than the other. The authorities do not make clear how common
is the type ot statute here considered.
Iv[arfield v. Traction Co., (1924) 111 Oh. St. 139, 144 N. E. 689.
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tion with what has been solely the business of a particular prede-
cessor,32 such property, if it would have fed such predecessor's
mortgage had it been acquired by that predecessor should do so
now. Such a statute should, in the absence of controlling language
the other way be construed as manifesting an intent that property
acquired solely in connection with the business of a particular
predecessor be treated as though acquired by that predecessor
and be subjected to the lien of that predecessor's mortgage.3 -
In other words, the state allows consolidation, merger or reorgan-
ization but seeks to protect the mortgage creditors of the old
company, in this respect, to the same extent as if it were contin-
uing.3 Statutes of this type may be found applying to consolida-
32See Hamlin v. Jerrard, (1859) 72 Me. 62, 80" Trust Co. v. Trac
tion Co., (1922) 106 Oh. St. 577, 597 et seq., 140 N. E. 380. Cf. also
Marfield v. Traction Co., (1924) 111 Oh. St. 139, 144 N. E. 589.
Where fhe property acquired is such that it is within the terms
of a predecessor's mortgage but is not used in connection with any busi-
ness the predecessor had actually conducted, then such property should
feed the predecessor's mortgage alone if the successor is a new com-
pany, and should probably be allocated between the predecessor s
mortgagee and the successor company on principles to be later con-
sidered, if the successor was an existing company at the time of suc-
cession.
Similarly, where the property acquired is within the terms of the
predecessor's mortgage, but is used in connection not only with what
had been the predecessor's business, but also with what had been the
successor's business, before succession, it would seem that, under
such a statute, properly construed property should not be subjected as
an entirety to the first lien of the predecessor's mortgage. Such prop-
erty should be allocated to the predecessor's mortgage in a way
similar to that in which property is allocated to the various mort-
gagees where there is more than one predecessor. The principles ap-
plicable are discussed later in this article.
The theory on which these distinctions are based is this A
statute of the type under consideration manifests an intent that the
successor shall stand in the position of the predecessor. (1). \\"here
the successor is an existing company it is pretty clearly not intended
that all acquisitions made by it should be treated as acquisitions by the
predecessor. Acquisitions made in connection with what was formerlv
its own business should be treated as acquisitions by it alone and the
predecessor's mortgagee should have no claim thereto. Acquisitions
made in connection with what was formerly tie predecessors business
should feed the predecessor's mortgage. While acquisitions made
in connection with what was formerly the business of neith-
er should be treated as acquisitions by both (at least when the
acquisition would have been intra vires of either). (2). Oii the other
hand where the successor is a new company it is fair to assume that
the statute intended that all its acts should, for these purposes, be
treated as those of the predecessor. The matter, however, is one ol
statutory intent and is not settled by the authorities.
33The question arises here incidentally as to what effect such a
statute will have on property acquired by the successor company out-
side of its state of charter. It seems clear that such a statute norially
creates an-in rem obligation in the state of charter as to property in
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tions, mergers, and possibly also, though probably less commonly,
to reorganizations. But where there is only a purchase of assets
it is uncommon to find such a statute. The parties, however, may
agree among themselves that the succeeding company will stand
in the place of the old so far as the mortgage obligations of the
latter are concerned ;34 such an agreement is rare.
Where there is a statute of the kind under consideration,
making it clear that the successor is to stand in the predecessor's
shoes, so that as a result, property acquired by the successor would
feed the predecessor's mortgage (because of the after-acquired
clause obligation), a question arises, in cases where the successor
takes over at the same time the property of two or more pre-
decessors each of which had a mortgage with an after-acquired
clause on its property as to which of such mortgages the after-
acquired property of the successor will feed."  Where the Prop-
erty acquired is within the terms of only one predecessor s mort-
gage it should feed such predecessor's mortgage alone and not
that of any other predecessor. Where, however, the property
acquired is within the terms of the mortgage of more than one
predecessor it seems that a distinction should be taken.30 In those
cases where the new property added by the successor is used solely
in connection with what had been the business of a particular pre-
decessor, it is submitted that such a statute as we are considering
should, in the absence of controlling language, be construed as
manifesting an intent that such property feed the mortgage of that
predecessor. In those cases where the new property acquired is
used in connection with what had been the business of all, or is
used in a business not carried on by any predecessor, such prop-
erty should be held "the common property of all in some proper
that state, thus differing from the other type of statute considered in
this article. See n. 30. It also creates an in personam obligation to per-
form all the duties imposed thereby on the constituent companies, and
among such duties would be that of subjecting certain after-acquired
property no matter where acquired, to the lien of the predecessor's
mortgage. This in personam obligation, being specifically enforceable,
would give rise to an equitable lien on property wherever acquired on
the same principles as does an after-acquired property clause.
34Cf. the agreement discussed in Metropolitan Trust Co. v Chicago
& E. I. R. Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1918) 253 Fed. 868, 871.
3
5 If property were acquired by the successor which was not within
the terms of the after-acquired clause of any predecessor's mortgage.
the statute would not affect the situation and, unless governed by prin-
ciples to be later considered, such property would not feed the mortgage
of any predecessor.
36See discussion in Note 32 supra, of an analogous situation.
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ratio."" Thus in the case of an interurban railroad it was
decided that on foreclosure sale the proceeds should be dis-
tributed in proportion to the respective power requirements of the
predecessor companies which were to be determined by a special
master.38 In that case the successor added a power house which
had supplanted a number of power houses formerly maintained
by the constitutent companies. The new power house was of
course an indispensable factor in the operation of the various roads.
If a successor under such a statute is the substantial continuation
of the predecessors39 the power house added by it and used in
connection with the business of the predecessors may be treated
as if added by all the constituent companies and hence should feed
the mortgages of all such predecessors. The conception of having
the mortgaged property become the "common property of all in
some proper ratio" is somewhat new. This probably means that
while the legal title is in the successor, each of the predecessors'
mortgages has an equitable interest, in the nature of a tenancy in
common. It is submitted that some proportion of distribution
similar to that adopted in the case under discussion, based upon
requirements, mileage, or value can be fairly applied in each case
and is sound and workable.
A second ground for holding that certain property acquired
by a successor feeds the mortgage of a predecessor when no
such statute or agreement of the parties exists,'0 is the assumption
by the successor of all the obligations of a predecessor including
its mortgage obligations (not merely its debt'1 ), or the imposi-
37Trust Co. v. Traction Co., (1922) 106 Oh. St. 577 609, 610, 140
N. E. 380. We are assuming here that the successor is a new company and
that the only question is of allocation between predecessors. On the
question of allocation between predecessors and the successor. see
note 32.38Trust Co. v. Traction Co., (1922) 106 Oh. St. 577 140 N. E. 380.39Cf. Marfield v. Traction Co., (1924) 111 Oh. St. 139, 144 N. E. 689,
where the court said, in speaking of a successor company under such a
statute: The "substantial existence of the constituent companies was
thereby perpetuated."
40See especially for typical cases where no such statute or agree-
ment exists, Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. N. Y. Rys. Co., (D.C.N.Y.
1923) 293 Fed. 429, 432 et seq., Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Chicago &
E. I. R. Co., (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1918) 253 Fed. 868, 871, N. Y. Secur.
Co. v. L. E. & St. L. Consol. R. Co., (C.C. Ind. 1900) 102 Fed. 382,
398, Diggs v. Fidelity & Dep. Co., (1910) 112 Md. 50, 75 At. 517
4"Where the debt only as distinguished from the mortgage obliga-
tions is assumed no contract to give a lien on any after-acquired prop-
erty (even assuming that the clause includes successors) can be made
out. In such a case the mere assumption of the debt "creates merely
a personal obligation" and "leaves the lien as it finds it. It does not
by itself enlarge or spread the lien to the property of the new debtor."
Miss. Valley Tr. Co. v. So. Trust Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1919) 261 Fed.
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tion of such obligations where there is a statute in the charter
state which, while not of the type above considered requiring the
successor to stand in the predecessor's shoes, nevertheless pro-
vides that the successor shall be bound by the predecessor's obli-
gations. If there is such an assumption or imposition, and if
the after-acquired clause of the mortgage of such predecessor
properly construed, is applicable to property acquired by a suc-
ceeding company, then after-acquired property of a successor of
the kinds described in a predecessor's mortgage will feed that
mortgage.4 2  As we have seen, however, ordinarily an after-
acquired clause only covers property to be acquired by the
mortgagor.4 3  Hence, the mere assumption or imposition of the
obligation of the after-acquired clause does not, in such cases,
subject after-acquired property of the successor to the lien of
such a mortgage.4"
Again, if the successor assumes the mortgage obligations of
a predecessor, or if there is a statute in the charter state, of the
type just considered, and if the mortgage contains covenants to
acquire property or to maintain, replace, or the like, throughout
the life of the mortgage, the succeeding company will be bound
thereby because it has assumed or had imposed upon it such
covenant and after-acquired property used for maintenance re-
placements or the like will feed the original mortgage.'
It should be noticed in passing that a view has been ex
pressed 6 to the effect that a so-called "mandatory" covenant to
maintain is binding upon the successor upon the theory that the
obligation "runs with the property acquired from the constitu-
ent." Two persuasive objections to this suggestion are, first.
765, 767 see also, Susquehanna Tr. & Safe Deposit Co. v. United Tel.
& Tel. Co., (C. C. A. 3d Cir. 1925) 6 Fed. (2d) 179, 181 cf. Commercial
Tr. Co. v. Chat. Ry. & Light Co. (D.C. Tenn. 1921) 281 Fed. 856, 860"
Irving Bank-Columbia Tr. Co. v. N. Y. Rys. Co., (D.C. N.Y 1923)
292 Fed. 429, 433 aff'd without opinion (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1923) 292 Fed.
440.
42Compton v. Jesup, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1895) 68 Fed. 263, 2874 3See cases cited in note 17
*
4 Metrop. Tr. Co. v. Chi. & E. I. R. Co.. (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1918)
253 Fed. 868 N. Y. Sec. Co. v. L. E. & St. L. Consol. R. Co.. (C.C.
Ind. 1900) 102 Fed. 382, 398. But see, In re Sentenne & Green Co..
(D.C. N.Y 1903) 120 Fed. 436, 440.
4nNatonal Bank of W & B. v. N. C. & S. R. Co., (1911) 9 Del. Ch.
258, 81 Atil. 70. (Noted in 25 Harv. L. Rev. 294). Commer. Tr. Co. v.
Chat. Ry. & Lt. Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1921) 281 Fed. 856, may be in part ex-
plicable on this ground. See also, in re Sentenne & Green Co. (D.C.
N.Y. 1903) 120 Fed. 436. But see, Metropolitan Co. v. Chicago & E. 1.
R. Co. (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1918) 253 Fed. 868, 878 et seq.
40Blair, Allocation of After-Acquired Property, 40 Harv. L. Rev.
222. 234.
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that there seems to be no authority for the view that such a cov-
enant would run and the doctrine is one not lending itself readily
to extension by analogy, and, second, that while it is true that
the burden of certain covenants will run with the land where
there is "privlty, ' 47 the only instance where the burden of a
covenant runs with the land where there is no "privity" is that
of a fencing covenant and the exception, if that be one, (it may
b.e more correctly classed as an easement), is confined thereto.
Furthermore it seems undesirable to invoke so doubtful a doctrine
to accomplish a result which the parties can substantially provide
for, if it is really contemplated, by requiring in the mortgage
that any successor must assume such covenant. Such a require-
ment is very common and can hardly escape the attention of the
parties.
Accession is a third and common ground by virtue of which
property of the successor acquired after the succession will be sub-
ject to the mortgage of a predecessor company. It seems clear that
when such property acquired by the successor becomes an acces-
sion (in the commonly accepted sense) to mortgaged property
it feeds the mortgage, 8 unaided by any after-acqired clause.
Thus one mile more or less of rails added to many other miles
amounts to an accession in the commonly accepted sense."0 ,\nd
the same is true, for example, of repairs on a car ° or on any other
47
"Privity," as used in this sense, involves tenure between
the party bound and the party benefited or at least that the one bound
or benefited has an easement or profit in the land the one benefited
or bound owns. See Morse v. Aldrich, (1837) 19 Pick. (Mass.) 449.
Consider, however 1 Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 391.
4SMiss. Valley Tr. Co. v. So. Trust Co. (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1919)
261 Fed. 765, 781 Hinchman v. Pt. Defiance Ry. Co. (1896) 14 Wash.
349, 44 Pac. 867 Trust Co. of Amer. v. City of Rhmnelander, (C.C. \\is.
1910) 182 Fed. 64, 69- Trust Co. v. Traction Co., (1922) 106 Oh. St.
577 140 N. E. 380- National Bank of W & B. v. N. C. & S. R. Co.,(1911) 9 Del. Ch. 358, 81 At. 70- Commer. Trust Co. v. Chat. Rv. &
Light Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1921) 281 Fed. 856- and see, Dunham v. Rv
Co., (1863) 1 Wall. 254. 17 L. Ed. 584, and Porter v. Pittsburg Steel
Co., (1887) 122 U. S. 267 7 Sup. Ct. 1206, 30 L. Ed. 1210. It is mna-
terial whether the accession is to realty see, Miss. Valley Trust Co. v.
So. Trust Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1919) 261 Fed. 765. 781 Hinchman v.
Pt. Defiance Ry. Co., (1896) 14 Wash. 349, 359. 44 Pac. 867 or to per-
sonality. Miss. Valley Trust Co. v. So. Trust Co.. (C.C.A. 8th Cir.
1918) 261 Fed. 765, 781.
°49 iss. Valley Trust Co. v. So. Trust Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1918)
261 Fed. 765, 781, Hinchman v. Pt. Defiance Rv. Co., (1896) 14 Wash.
349, 44 Pac. 867
50fiss. Valley Trust Co. v. So. Trust Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1918)
261 Fed. 765, 781, Hamlin v. Jerrard, (1881) 72 Me. 62. 81, where the
court said: "The repairs upon it being mere accessions to the mort-
gaged chattel."
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specific chattel. 5 There is some loose talk, however, in certain
cases52 as to the principle of accession applying in a much broader
sense. But such statements were not necessary for the dlecisioil
of those cases. Under this broader application of the theory
of accession where, for example, railroad properties are mortgagee
with an after-acquired clause, and the successor effects improve-
ments, extensions, or additions, or makes replacements or sub-
stitutions, they would become subject to the predecessor's mort-
gage by virtue of accession. But if that is true it would be iinma-
tenal whether or not there was an after-acquired clause, for, if
such property becomes a part of the principal road by accession,
it would be subject to the predecessor's mortgage irrespective of
the after-acquired clause. Moreover, the better view is that actual
physical unity is an essential element of accession.5" It is sub-
mitted that the broader application of the theory of accession
is not sound. Thus goods added to a stock of goods or cars
to a railroad system are not accessions and should not be so
treated.
A fourth ground on which property of a successor acquired
after the succession may become subjected to the lien of the
predecessor's mortgage is suggested by the important decision
of Wade v. Chicago, Springfield and St. Lois Railhav Co.54
In this case the mortgagor at the time of executing the
mortgage on its proposed railroad between named points, had
surveyed and mapped the entire route and secured certain "rights
of way" A construction company contracted with the mortgagor
to do all things necessary to complete the railroad in consideration
for which the construction company was to receive specified
amounts of the mortgagor's bonds and stocks for each mile
of railroad actually completed. The construction company secured,
presumably with its own funds, most of the necessary right of
way and graded considerable portions of the road. It actually
completed only two miles of the road, received bonds and stocks
therefor, and "conveyed and transferred" all the rest of the
51Cf. 1 R. C. L. 118, Accession, sec. 5.52See Compton v Jesup, (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1895) 68 Fed. 263. 287
and cf. Commercial Trust Co. v. Chatt. Ry and Light Co., (D.C. Tenn.
1921) 281 Fed. 856.53
"The general rule is that the owner of property whether theproperty be movable or immovable, has the right to that which is
united to it by accession or adjunction." Pierce v. Goddard, (1839) 22
Pick. (Mass.) 559, 561. See also First Parish in Sudbury v. Jones(1851) 8 Cush. (Mass.) 184, 189" Hunt v. Bay State Iron Co., (1867) 97
Mass. 279, 283:
54(1893) 149 U. S. 327 13 Sup. Ct. 892, 37 L. Ed. 755.
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incompleted road to a second construction company which trans-
ferred the same to two new railroad companies. The chief pro-
moter of the mortgagor was the sole owner of the first construction
company, the second construction company was a firm consisting
of his brother and brother-in-law, and at least one of the new
railroad companies was orgamzed by this original promoter. The
court held that those portions of the road which were later com-
pleted by the two new railroad companies were subject to the
mortgage. The opinion states that the original railroad company
obtained an equitable interest in the rights of way and other
property acquired by the first construction company Some parts
of property added by the two new companies may have become
accessions to property in which the original railroad company had
the equitable interest just mentioned. But a large amount of
property was necessarily added to complete the road which was
not accessory On what grounds could such property have been
held subject to the mortgage? The court was very careful, in
relating the history of the case, to show that it was a family
affair. By the successive transfers it was evidently hoped to avoid
the effect of the obligation to complete the road and subject it
as completed to the lien of the original mortgage. In such a case
"the mortgagor is impliedly bound to buy and complete the thing
mortgaged as described, and bring it under the lien of the
mortgage, without lien or encumbrance."55 In this situation the
succeeding companies (having had knowledge or notice of the
mortgage and the whole procedure having been so clearly designed
to escape the effect of the mortgage obligations) were really aiding
in causing a breach of the mortgagor's covenants with knowledge
thereof. Such action was tortious. The property so added by
the successor and not subjected voluntarily to the mortgage may
be subjected to it by law as a matter of specific reparation."°
It is sometimes suggested that the successor, being in pnvitv
with the predecessor and having notice of the mortgage, is es-
topped to deny that its after-acquired property becomes subject
to the predecessor's mortgage. It is not clear whether the courts
have in mind an estoppel in pais, estoppel by estate, estoppel by
deed, or some other kind of estoppel. None, however, apply
55Harris v. Youngstown Bridge Co., (C.C.A. 6th Cir. (1898) 90 Fed.
322, 330.
56It is of course apparent that no actual successor was involved in
the Wade Case. But if a successor as defined in note 1 had been formed
instead of the two new railroad companies it is clear that the decision
would have been the same.
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and the term is misused and question begging. There is clearly
no estoppel in pais because, where there has been no assumption
of mortgage obligations, there is not even a remote ground
for finding a representation on which to base such an estoppel.
'knd, where there has been such an assumption, the successor
does not represent that its after-acquired property will feed the
mortgage unless the after-acquired clause on a proper construc-
tion, includes after-acquired property of a successor, in which
case it is not necessary to invoke estoppel." Estoppel by estate,
so-called, exists between landlord and tenant, and prevents a tenant
denying the title of his landlord. The suggested analogy in the
situation under consideration is that the successor in taking the
mortgaged premises from the predecessor is estopped to deny
as applied to it the covenants in the predecessor s mortgage. It is
obvious from a mere statement of the case that estoppel by estate
has no operation here. And there is even less ground for
urging an estoppel by deed. No doctrine of estoppel can hell).
The term used in this connection is misleading and tends to obscure
rather than to assist.
We have thus seen that, while, as a general rule, after-
acquired property of a successor company will not feed the
mortgage of a predecessor it may, nevertheless, be subject to the
predecessor's mortgage in several situations
(1) Where a statute manifests an intent that the successor
be treated as the substantial continuation of the predecessor for
the protection of creditors, if the predecessor's mortgage has an
after-acquired clause, it seems likely that after-acquired property
of the successor will feed the mortgage of the predecessor if it
is solely employed in connection with what had been that coi-
panv's business and is within its after-acquired clause, a part
of such property will feed the predecessor's mortgage where the
after-acquired property is used partly in connection with what
had been the predecessor s and partly in connection with what
had been the successor's business. The ratio allocable in such
57See Compton v. Jesup, (C.C.A. 6th Cir 1897) 68 Fed. 203:
Commercial Trust Co. v Chatt. Ry & Light Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1921)
281 Fed. 856: Susquehanna Trust & Safe Dep. Co. v Umited Tel. &
Tel. Co., (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1925) 6 F (2d) 179. Cf. Dictum suggestion
in Trust Co. of ,\mer. v. City of Rhmnelander, (C.C. Wis. 1910) 182
Fed. 64. Even where there has been an assumption of the mortgage
obligations there is really no estoppel because the promise to subject
after-acquired property to the predecessor's mortgage is not a repre
sentation that property will be acquired and because there is no re-
liance-the bonds having been issued long before the successors
promise is made.
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case to the predecessor's mortgage is determined upon the principle
considered above,
(2) Where the successor has assumed the mortgage obliga-
tions of a predecessor or has had imposed upon it such obligations
under a statute other than of the type considered in (1) above,
and where the predecessor's mortgage contains an after-acquired
clause broad enough to cover property of a successor or covenants
to maintain the mortgaged property, or to acquire property and
subject it to the mortgage or some similar covenant or covenants,
and property is acquired by the successor within the terms of
such covenant or covenants, it feeds the predecessor s mortgage,
(3) Where property added by the successor becomes an
accession to property subject to the predecessor's mortgage, it
feeds that mortgage, and
(4) Where the facts are such that acts done by the successor
are tortious such as causing a breach of the predecessor's aflirma-
tive obligation to acquire property, the like property added by the
successor may become subject to the predecessor s mortgage as
a matter of specific reparation.
III
WHERE A COMPANY MORTGAGES ITS PROPERTY VITii AN
AFTER-AcQUIRED CLAUSE, AND THEN TRANSFERS ITS PROPERTY
TO ANOTHER COMPANY WHICH HAS, AT THE Ti.!E OF TJIE
SUCCESSION, A MORTGAGE ON ITS PROPERTY WITH AN AFTER-
ACQUIRED CLAUSE AND SUBSEQUENTLY ACQUIRES PROPERTY
In this unsettled field we must be guided by analogies, for
no case has been found which deals with the problems arising under
the facts here assumed. We are concerned at this point only
with situations where there has been a merger or possibly a sale
for only in such a case could the successor have had corporate
life prior to the succession. Since consolidated and reorganized
companies, being new organizations, had no corporate life prior
to the date of the succession, they could have had no mortgage
prior to that date. We have seen that the property acquired
by a successor will not feed the mortgage of a predecessor unless
some special grounds for that result is found. \Vhat variations in
the rules heretofore discussed, relating to such special grounds,
will it make if such a merging or purchasing company has, prior
to the succession, a mortgage with an after-acquired clause on
its property?
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WAe shall consider, first, instances where a statute might
affect this problem"8 and assume the case where A company
merges into B Company, the statute indicating, when properly
construed, that, in such a case, B Company is to stand in the
shoes of A Company so far as A Company's mortgage obligations
are concerned and where both companies have, at the time of the
merger, mortgages with after-acquired clauses on their property
As to property thereafter acquired by B Company in connection
with what had been solely the business of B Company before the
merger, it seems probable that the statute would be construed as
permitting the B Company mortgagee to have a lien thereon and
as not giving A Company mortgagee any interest therein. On the
other hand, as to property acquired by the B Company to be used
in connection solely with what had been A Company's business
before the merger, it seems equally clear that the statute would
require, in so far as it has jurisdiction so to require, i. e.. as to
property acquired in a charter state,19 that the A Company mort-
gagee obtain a prior lien thereon provided that the new property is
the kind included within A Company's after-acquired clause. But
as to property that is not thus allocable either entirely to what was
formerly A Company's or entirely to what was formerly B Com-
pany's business it would seem that such property, if it is used in
connection with what was formerly the business of A and B or
what was neither the business of A nor B, but is within the
after-acquired clauses of both mortgages, should be allocated be-
tween the two mortgagees on principles discussed in Part II of
this paper Such part as is allocable to the A Company mortgagee
should, so far as the statute can give that result, that is, so far as
the property is acquired in the charter state,"0 feed the A mortgage
first, with a second lien for the B Company mortgagee. The bal-
ance should feed the B Company mortgage only "" The matter
however, is. as has been stated before, one of statutory construc-
tion.
:
8 Instances are rare where a statute requires a purchasing collpany
to stand in the shoes of the selling company so far as its mortgage
obligations are concerned.
5 9We are assuming that such statutes apply only to domestic cor
porations.
GOSee note 59, supra.
6GAs to principles governing the situation where the property added
is not used in connection with either what had been the predecessor s
or the successor's business, see discussion in footnote 32 supra and see
also discussion in Part II of this paper.
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Where B Company acquires property outside the state of
charter a different result is obtained. Outside such state of
charter the statute under consideration creates no in rein interest
in the A Company mortgage in property acquired by B Com-
pany. Such statute does, however, impose an in personam
obligation on the prormsee to subject property under the circum-
stances above considered, to the lien of the predecessor's mortgage.
When, then, the successor acquires property outside the state of
charter the predecessor's claim, if any, is based on this in personam
obligation and, as the successor has a prior in personam obliga-
tion in the form of a promise to its own mortgagee, the prior
in personam obligation should prevail and the lien of the pre-
decessor's mortgage on such property be subordinated to that
of the successor.6
-2
If, on such a merger or purchase, all the mortgage obliga-
tions of the merged or selling company are assumed by the succes-
sor or if there is a statute in the charter state which while not of
the type requiring the successor to stand in the predecessor's shoes,
nevertheless provides that the successor shall be bound by the
predecessor's obligations, we have the same problems as were dis-
cussed in Part II of this article as to property acquired by the suc-
cessor in regard to situations where the merged or selling com-
pany's after-acquired clause included successors or where the
merged or selling company had convenanted to acquire property
or to maintain the mortgaged property, and the like, throughout
the life of the mortgage. The principles discussed in Part II of
this article would apply here. While it is true that such an assump-
tion of the mortgage obligations involves a contract for the benefit
of third parties, if the promise runs to the predecessor company
and not to the mortgagee, yet this fact should make no difference in
most jurisdictions, (even where Lawrence v. Fox" is not law)
since the proceeding is in equity 64
6 2See discussion of an analogous situation in the following para-
graph-63(1859) 20 N. Y. 268.
64See I Williston, Contracts, sec. 383, where it is stated: "But the
only one of the United States where it has definitely been decided that
the mortgagee cannot proceed against the grantee is Massachusetts."
Professor Williston then shows that in a number of states
which do not follow Lawrence v. Fox, the mortgagee may sue
the assuming grantee either by statute, in equity, or in some cases
even at law. If there is a supplemental indenture between the successor
and the mortgagee of the predecessor wherein the mortgage obligations
are assumed, no third party contract is involved.
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There is one additional complication, however, where the
merging or purchasing successor has, at the time it assumed or
had imposed upon it by such a statute the mortgage obligations of
the merged or selling company, a mortgage of its own with an
after-acquired clause, due to the fact that such a successor has also
promised its own mortgagee that all property acquired by it after
the execution of its mortgage will feed its own mortgage. In such
a situation, it is submitted that property acquired after the
succession which fits the after-acquired clauses of both mortgages
should feed the mortgage of B Company first because B Company's
promise to its own mortgagee is always prior in point of time
(where both companies have mortgages on their property at the
time of succession) to its promise, or statutory in personam obliga-
tion to the mortgagee of A Company, since this latter obligation is
not created until the time of the succession. It is apparent in this
case that one of two innocent promisees must suffer. In such a
situation it is submitted that the ordinary rule should be applied
and that of two specifically enforceable executory obligations to
convey the same res the prior should prevail.
A helpful analogy in reaching this result is the case where A
contracts to sell Blackacre to B, and then contracts to sell it to C.
It seems clear that where B or C seeks specific performance,
where both are parties, B will prevail.6 5 In other words, the
promise which is prior in point of time prevails."' Each has
an equity and C could probably get specific performance if B
was not a party " Thus we find an established rule holding
that the prior promise prevails. The result is the same where A
contracts to sell Blackacre when he acquires it."' The analogy
seems quite close for the successor contracted with the trustee
under its own mortgage to subject all after-acquired property to
the lien of that mortgage, and later the same company contracts or
has imposed upon it an in personam obligation to subject some of
such property to the lien of a predecessor's mortgage.
A still closer analogy is found in the case where A mortgages
his after-acquired property to B and later mortgages his after-
65McGinn v. Willey (1914) 24 Cal. App. 303, 141 Pac. 49. See also
Bethea v. McCullough, (1916) Ala. 195 480, 70 S. E. 680; Thistle Mills
Co. v. Bone, (1900) 92 Md. 47 48 ktl. 37 Cf. Alston v. Savage, (1917) 173
N. C. 213, 91 S. E. 842.602 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., sec. 756.
67Howe v. Howe & Owen Ball Bearing Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1907)
154 Fed. 820.6$White Marble Lime Co. v. Lumber Co., (1919) 205 Mich. 634, 172
N. W 603.
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acquired property to C. It has been held in such cases that B,
who has the prior promise in point of time, is entitled to a prior
lien.69 This is of course subject to what might appear to be an ex-
ception, namely, that if the mortgage to C is a purchase money
mortgage, C will get an effective prior lien. This seeming excep-
tion is not an exception at all but is based upon the fact that that
portion of the property sufficient to satisfy C's lien really never
became the property of A and that A, could not mortgage to B
more than his interest remaining after the satisfaction of C's pur-
chase money mortgage.7 It is submitted therefore that where
there is an assumption or imposition, as above considered, of the
after-acquired clause or the maintenance or some similar coven-
ant or covenants by a merging or purchasing company, after-
acquired property which fits the after-acquired clauses of both
mortgages will feed first the mortgage of the merging or purchas-
ing company and then that of the predecessor.7 ' The net effect of
such assumption, or imposition, is that the mortgage of the merged
or selling company obtains a second lien on such property which
but for the assumption or imposition it would not have.
Accessions added by the merging or purchasing company will
feed the mortgage or mortgages on the property to which such
new property is an accession. Where the new property is acces-
sory to property subject to more than one mortgage, it feeds each
mortgage in the order of the priority between them. "
69Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn R. T., (D.C. N.Y.
1921) 276 Fed. 152. See Meyer v. Johnson, (1875) 53 Ala. 344; Thomp-
son v. Valley R. Co., (1889) 132 .U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct. 29, 33 L. Ed. 256
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Bankers & Merchants Tel. Co..
(C.C. N.Y. 1888) 36 Fed. 288, 298, affd. 147 U. S. 431, 13 Sup. Ct. 396,
37 L. Ed. 231.70This view is in harmony with the cases which hold that where the
property supplied by the purchase money mortgagee becomes acces-
sory to other property of the mortgagor, the mortgagor having an
after-acquired clause in a previous mortgage to another mortgagee and
the property supplied by the purchase money mortgagee being within
the scope thereof, the purchase money mortgagee secures only a sub-
sequent lien thereon. See in this connection Galveston R. R. v.
Cowdrey, (1870) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 459, 20 L. Ed. 199. Tippett and Wood v.
Barham, 180 Fed. 76. Porter v. Steel Co.. (1887) 122 U. S. 267 8 Sup.
Ct. 101, 31 L. Ed. 160. Compare Cox v. Lighting Co., (1909) 151 N. C.
62, 65 S. E. 648.
-Of course, as before indicated, if only the merged or selling com-
pany's after-acquired clause obligation is assumed by or imlposed on
the successor, unless, properly construed, it covers property acquired
by other than the merged or selling company, after-acquired property
of the successor does not "fit" such clause and hence will not feed at
all the merged or selling companies' mortgage.72Hamlin v. Jerrard, (1881) 72 Me. 62.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Facts permitting the application of principles discussed in
connection with the case of Wade v. Chicago, Springfield & St.
Louis Railroad,3 may occur in the case of a merger or sale. If A
Company sells its assets to or merges into B Company, and it ap-
pears that one of the objects of the sale or merger is an attempt to
relieve A Company of its affirmative obligations, express or implied,
to acquire certain property and to subject it to its mortgage, such
action, if such property when acquired by B Company is not sub-
jected voluntarily to the mortgage of A Company, would be tor-
tious and such property should be subjected to the mortgage of A
Company as a matter of specific reparation. The question remains,
in this situation, as to which of the two obligations will prevail-
the promise of B Company to its own mortgagee or its obligation.
arising subsequently, to subject certain property to the mortgage
of the predecessor. It is submitted that since the obligation in each
case is to convey the same property, that obligation which arose
first should prevail as in the case where B Company assumes the
mortgage obligations of A Company The net result would be that
the mortgagee of B Company would obtain a first lien on such
property and the mortgagee of A Company would have a second
lien thereon.
It appears, then, that where a predecessor merges into or sells
its assets to a successor (each company at the time of such suc-
cession having a mortgage with an after-acquired clause) prop-
erty thereafter acquired by the successor will ordinarily feed
only its own mortgage but will sometimes feed the two mortgages
according to the following order
(1) Where a statute manifests an intent that the successor
be treated as the substantial continuation of the predecessor for
these purposes, if the predecessor's mortgage has an after-acquired
clause it seems likely that after-acquired property of the successor
used solely in connection with what was the predecessor's business
and within the terms of the mortgage of both companies should.
if acquired in a charter state, feed first the predecessor's mort-
gage and then that of the successor, but if acquired outside that
state, should feed these mortgages in the inverse order. Property
used partly in connection with what was formerly the predeces-
sor's business and partly in connection with what was formerly the
successor's business and within the terms of both mortgages should
be allocated in part to the predecessor's mortgage under the
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principle indicated above. As to property so allocated and acquired in
a charter state, that mortgage should have a prior lien and the suc-
cessor's mortgage a second lien while as to property acquired out-
side the charter state the converse should be held true, but as to the
balance the successor's mortgage should have a prior lien regard-
less of where the property is situated.
(2) Where the successor has assumed the mortgage obliga-
tions of the predecessor or has had such obligations imposed upon
it by a statute other than of the type considered in (1) above, such
property will nevertheless feed the mortgage of the successor
first but the predecessor's mortgage will, if the predecessor's niort-
gage contained an after-acquired clause broad enough to include
property of a successor or covenants to maintain the mortgaged
property, or to acquire property and subject it to the mortgage or
some similar covenant or covenants, have a second lien on such
types of property when acquired,
(3) Accessions to property will feed the mortgages on that
property in the order of their priority, and
(4) In certain situations, the acts of the successor, in causing
a breach of the predecessor's affirmative obligations to acquire
property or the like, being tortious, such or similar property
when acquired by the successor will feed the successor s niort-
gage first and the mortgagee of the predecessor will obtain a
second lien thereon.
